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We tend to act upon what we believe to be true. When 
we deal with the world, we do so in a way which retlects 
our view of the world. This view has largely been 
transmitted to us by those who have cared for us as 
children. Our parents and guardians bave shared with 
us a great deal of information including, to some degree, 
our methods for dealing with other sentient beings, both 
human and nonhuman. 
As we matured, we were faced with the moral 
problem of animal exploitation. For most of us, this 
problem appeared long after we had begun to use 
animals in everyday life. We were not given the 
information with which to make a rational decision 
regarding the treatment of nonhumans. We found this 
information later in life. As a society, we do not provide 
children with the information necessary to later make 
rational choices regarding the treatment of animals. 
We do not give children an opportunity to empathize 
with nonbumans. 
Before we continue, we should define a few basic 
terms. I will use the terms 'human' and 'person' more 
or less interchangeably to refer to rational persons and 
those who will become rational persons. I will use the 
words 'animal' and 'nonhuman' to refer to members 
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of those species other than human. 'Empathy' has 
referred and will refer to the act of imagining the 
experiences, thoughts, and emotions of another from 
the other's point of view. A 'dynamic agent' will 
denote a being which makes decisions affecting its 
own existence. 
Our basic social skills are transmitted to us by those 
who care for us before we begin to make our own moral 
and interpersonal decisions. According to Jean Piaget, 
this ability begins to manifest itself between the ages 
of seven and twelve, during which children reach a state 
ofconcrete operations, a state in which a consistent view 
of life events begins to emerge (Papalia 24). The ability 
to make these decisions becomes more refined as 
children mature and reach a stage of formal operations, 
[learn to deal with abstracts as well as concrete 
situations] (24). Research consistently shows that 
children recognize [and usually imitate] the social 
norms of their communities. Proponents of both social 
learning theories and cognitive development theories 
agree on this point. 
The social learning theory, which emphasizes that 
children are encouraged to imitate adult behaviors, 
provides us with strong evidence to suggest that children 
do in fact imitate these behaviors. What is most 
interesting, perhaps, is that children seem to imitate 
behaviors which give no direct benefit to them (Bandura 
589-95). Imitation without direct benefit seems to imply 
Summer & Fall 1994 
Giving Children a Choice: A Proposal/or Developing Empathy 
that children gain some indirect benefit from mimicking 
the actions of their guardians. 
The cognitive developmentalist stresses the role of 
understanding to behavior in children. According to the 
tenets of this view, children want to become dynamic 
agents in their own lives. They gain underslanding of 
adult thought processes by imitating adult actions. They 
become dynamic agents in part by imitating these adult 
behaviors and demonstrating their new found 
competence to the community (Gleinnan 406-07). 
Unfortunately, the desire to be 'grown-up' can lead 
to problems. The desire to imitate adult behaviors is 
ingrained before the child is able to consider the reasons 
for this desire. [To the cognitive developmentalist, the 
former entails the latter]. Put simply, children attempt 
to imitate rational behavior before they themselves are 
rational creatures. Six year-old Jane may envy the fact 
that her older sister can drive a car, but Jane might not 
consider that she herself cannot even reach lhe pedals. 
If Jane should decide to drive the family car, there 
will be trouble. 
Another major disadvantage of this tendency to 
imitate is that children learn both desirable and 
undesirable behaviors. How often have we found that 
the children around us imitate our bad habits? Some 
children return from family gatherings with· 'colorful 
phrases' which their parents had never intended for them 
to hear. These phrases have an effect, when spoken by 
an adult, upon an adult audience. Children quickly find 
that they can also produce noticeable results by using 
these phrases on an adult audience. Many an 
embarrdssed parent would agree that a noticeable result 
is not always a desirable result. 
This tendency has consequences far outreaching the 
trivial. Imitation may be a vital factor in cases of sexual 
abuse. According to studies conducted by P. K. Trickett 
and E. J. Susman, many abusers were abused as children 
(274). These persons have learned a tool for inter-
personal relationships which, unfortunately, has lead 
them to perpetuate a cycle of abuse. 
On a more positive note, imitation can also be a 
factor which promotes beneficial social skills later in 
life. If the imitation of negative factors leads to the 
development of negative personality traits, it would 
seem safe to assume tllat imitation of some positive 
factors might lead to ilie development of positive 
personality traits. Early education emphasizes 
interpersonal skills, including cooperation, sharing and 
empathy. In a 1989 poll, researchers found that parents 
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ranked "sympailiy, empathy, [and] concern for others" 
as one of the top three ideal goals of a preschool 
environment (Papalia 205). Certainly, these are noble 
goals, but which beings does the term 'others' include? 
Do we even allow most children to consider animals 
as targets for empathy? Rarely. Do we permit ourselves, 
as a whole, to consider nonhumans as beings which 
may have 'human' experiences? Rarely. And when we 
do concede that nonhumans have similarities to humans, 
do we accentuate these similarities? Almost never. 
Both the 'moral point of view' and the utilitarian 
viewpoint require a developed sense of empathy 
(Pluhar). Our ability to recognize suffering in other 
beings and respond to this suffering stems from our 
ability to place ourselves into the situation of another 
being. There can be no true recognition of suffering, in 
others, without a previous experience of suffering in 
self. Likewise, iliere can be no true recognition of 
pleasure, in others, without a previous experience of 
pleasure in self. 
The suffering which humans have caused to 
nonhuman animals has in part arisen from an inability, 
or at least an unwillingness, to empailiize wiili animals. 
The Cartesians justified vivisection on ilie grounds that 
the animals they were vivisecting did not truly feel pain 
(14). To hold such a view, the Cartesians were forced 
to deny the evidence of their senses, forced to deny 
themselves the experience of empathy. A cry of pain, 
by a dog, is recognizable as such even to a small child. 
Had a Cartesian allowed himself a dog's pointof view, 
he would have looked at vivisection very differently. 
We humans prefer to separate ourselves from ilie 
animals which we exploit. Ronald McDonald doesn't 
carry around a butcher's knife or a cattle prod on 
television. Frank Perdue has dedicated himself to ilie 
proposition iliat consumers need not remember that they 
are eating animals. This February, an issue of People 
magazine featured a full-page Perdue ad extolling ilie 
virtues of skinless, boneless poultry products. As ilie 
caption reads, iliere is "no dis-assembly required" (44). 
Funny, I had always iliought ilie word for separating 
skin from tlesh and tlesh from bone was 'dissection.' 
Cartoons and illustrations almost always replace 
live animals in food advertisements, especially if the 
advertisements involve a suggestion of killing. Few 
people could describe, with any accuracy, the behavior 
of a mink living in ilie wild. You may find, as I have, 
that most popular uses of the word 'mink' are 
followed by the word 'coat' or 'stole.' Even pesticide 
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commercials and advertisements caricaturize insects 
as being deliberately malicious. How easy to kill a rat 
terrorizing your loved ones, how much harder to kill 
an animal building itself a home. 
In each of the above cases, the advertiser has tried 
to distance the consumer from any chance to empathize 
with an animal's suffering. Slaughterhouse films 
simply do not sell cheeseburgers. These observations 
may seem obvious, but they become important 
considerations when we want to encourage empathy 
with nonhuman animals. 
Our exposure to dead animals comes mostly in the 
form of food and clothing. As a species, we see most 
living animals as unfinished products-products 
which we finish by killing and then processing. 
Animals become a function of how we may use or 
dispose of them. Unfortunately, most children mature 
exposed to such a situation. Many of us were raised in 
such a situation. 
Western civilization goes to great lengths to 
divorce the experiences of being a human from the 
experiences of being a nonhuman. Separation of 
human and nonhuman is intrinsic among some of the 
words ~ith which humans describe that which is 
distasteful to us. Such slurs often attack the intelligence 
of the target. The names of nonhuman animals 
commonly describe qualities which we do not admire 
in human individuals. Take, for example the French 
betise. The word is a derivative ofbete, or beast. Taken 
literally, the word denotes an 'animal' or irrational 
frame of mind (Collins 27). Betise, translated strictly, 
means "animalish." In everyday language, the word 
is a derogatory term comparable to the English "dumb-
ox," or idiot. 
Peter Singer has made an important point about the 
distance we keep from the animals which our 
civilization eats. In Animal Liberation, he describes the 
care with which humans change the names of the flesh 
they eat from the barnyard [or, more likely, factory], 
to the table. I doubt that many young children have a 
clear indication of what 'veal' is. 'Ground beef' or, 
'hamburger,' has little obvious relationship to the animal 
from which it comes. 
We do call the fleshes of birds and fish by their 
original names when we serve them as food, However, 
the experiences of being either an aquatic creature or 
a bird are not quite as similar to the experiences of 
being a human as are tlle experiences of being a land-
bound manlffial. 
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The extent of our empathy must depend, in part, 
upon the extent of the similarities which we recognize 
between ourselves and other beings. At the very least, 
those beings with which humans empathize must be 
sentient. If we do not recognize any similarities, we 
cannot empathize at all. If our experiences are almost 
completely alien to those with which we would like to 
empathize, little rapport with such beings can be made. 
It is very difficult, for example, to empathize with 
an ant. We can recognize shared sensations such as pain, 
light, and sense of smell, but beyond such basics, we 
can not truly take the viewpoint of an ant. We can 
certainly speculate upon experiences foreign to our own, 
but our speculations will be vague, uncertain. 
How are children exposed to animals? What sort of 
model do we provide for them, so that they might take 
our example? In most cases, humans are not exposed 
to Hving animals at all. At the age of three or four, most 
children have had little contact with animals, except 
for contact with house pets. Aside from those animals 
which we keep as pets, and those which coexist with us 
on a daily basis [such as rodents, birds and insects], we 
rarely encounter other species. Those species which we 
do encounter are likely to be considered "pests," such 
as flies, rats or roaches. Even those species which do 
no direct harm to humans, such as sparrows or pigeons, 
seem annoying to some. 
How can a child connect the act of eating meat to 
the act of killing an animal when the child has little 
or no exposure to living animals? We shield children 
from the very existence of the slaughterhouse. Our 
language and, our treatment of those species with 
which we coexist give little indication, to children, 
that they are eating things which were once living, 
breathing creatures. 
As I know from personal experience, it is easier to 
consider eating a 'cheeseburger' than it is to justify 
eating a piece of 'ground, dead cow covered with 
fennented cow excretions.' 
The conscious recognition of shared experience is 
almost a synonym for empathy among beings. When 
this acknowledgment does not occur, empathy cannot 
occur. When we directour imagination towards the lives 
of other species, our empathetic impulses are directly 
limited by our knowledge of the experiences of these 
other species. 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, thatchildren 
embrace the thinking which underlies animal 
exploitation. The shock of discovering oneself a killer 
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is considerably lessened by a taste for beef or a fear of 
spiders. Even more importantly, animals are not seen 
as beings with which empathy can occur. This mentality, 
after denying the relationship of human experience to 
nonhuman experience, takes the following form: 
A. Nonhuman beings can be in a combination of 
four states: liVing or dead, captive or wild. 
B. Nonhumans which are liVing captives provide 
either amusement for humans, targets for 
experimentation, or food. 
e. Nonhumans which are both living and wild 
become a nuisance, a danger, a possible 
'product,' a target of 'sport,' or else they exit 
the scope of human affairs altogether. [While 
incomplete in an ecological sense, tllis view is 
nevertheless popular]. 
D. Animals which are captive and dead [at least 
those killed by humans] are a source of food 
and clothing. At the very least, they are to be 
discarded as a health threat. 
E. Animals which are wild and dead [which would 
be quite a contradiction if the words were being 
used differently] have littIe or no interest to 
humans oUler than as a potential source ofdisease. 
Although these premises have numerous pitfalls and 
inaccuracies when taken, Ule thinking behind these 
premises is widespread. 
For many, tIle decision to stop exploiting animals 
begins with an appeal to empathy. However, as I have 
mentioned, animals are not someUling with which we 
are encouraged to empathize. 
In many cases, nonhumans are presented side-by-
side WiUl tlle relative advantages and disadvantages which 
they provide for humans. The Funk & Wagnalls 
encyclopedia provides a useful example of this. The word 
rodent is followed by a definition of about two-hundred 
words. This definition consisL~ ofa biological description, 
a few sentences which describe rodent habitats, and a 
description of tIle ways in which various rodents benefit 
or harm humans (320-21). Some of the rodents described 
on these pages sound as if they were being advertised. 
Others sound as if they should be exterminated from the 
planet. In tlle context of this description, the rodem is a 
function of its usefulness to humanity. 
111at a rodent is a dynamic agent in its own existence 
never enters the definition. That a rodent exists inde-
pendent ofhuman intervention never enters the definition. 
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Perhaps if we expose children to nonhuman animals 
earlier, as dynamic beings, with an equitable emphasis 
upon the similarities between humans and nonhumans, 
these children will be less likely to dismiss nonhumans 
as unworthy of any moral consideration. Let us be 
realistic. At the very least, children will be able to 
consider animals as beings, and not as products. 
We need not try to 'sell' any sort of moral code 
to children or adolescents in order to increase 
empathy. We need not try to shock or traumatize 
children either. We simply need to examine those 
structures which view animals as products, and insist, 
in the interest of truthfulness, that such structures be 
altered to reflect the fact that animals are beings. We 
cannot expect children to empathize with static 
objects or products. If we inform our children that 
an animal's value depends upon its usefulness to 
humans, our children will treat animals as products. 
We need to demonstrate that each sentient being has 
an existence unto itself, more vital than its relation-
ship to humankind. 
Granted, to do this will not bring an immediate 
end to Ule suffering which humans cause nonhumans. 
To do this will not bring an immediate change to the 
way in which most humans view other species. But to 
do this, ultimately, will be to break down some of the 
artificial barriers which now separate the human 
experience of living from the nonhuman experience 
of living. 
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